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I.

Introduction

Recent efforts in the industrialized world to raise climate protection, like the Green Deal of
the European Union or the German $60 billion Climate Package, raised some concern about
the efficiency of climate policy on the global scale. As long as there are cheaper climate-change
mitigation options in developing countries, it tends to be counterproductive to spend money
for reinforced abatement in industrialized countries: critics argue that a dollar spent on greenhouse gas abatement in developing countries will bring about more of the urgently needed
climate protection than spending this dollar in the industrialized world. As the problem of
global warming is threatening life on earth, a waste of resources should be prevented and thus
international cooperative approaches aiming at using transfers to steer abatement activities
to places where abatement is cheapest should get particular weight. This is an efficiency (of
climate change mitigation) argument in favour of international climate transfers and thus of
global ‘climate finance’.
Yet, beyond the efficiency goal, there are arguments that tarnish the picture. On the one hand,
there is some ethical concern that developed countries will consider climate transfers as a
modern form of indulgence trading. On the other hand, there is a concern that developing
countries may want to misuse such transfers as an instrument for rent-seeking, i.e. for increasing the amount of development aid flowing to them.
One aspect that complicates a fair assessment of climate transfers is the occurrence of ‘other
benefits’ than those obtained from slowed global warming. As slowing or combatting global
warming is the primary objective of climate change mitigation, the associated benefits are
called primary benefits (see e.g. Buchholz et al. 2020). All ‘other benefits’ arising from a climate change mitigation measure (like the reducing of the burning of fossil fuels) are called
ancillary benefits or co-benefits. 1 While the primary effects are globally public, the ancillary
effects are regularly private from the point of view of a mitigation project’s host country.2
Therefore, the recipient of climate transfers hosting mitigation projects will enjoy these additional benefits, through which thus a redistribution from developed to developing countries

Recently, Sovacool et al. (2020) catalogued 128 prospective co-benefits alone to four European low carbon
transitions.
2
An example of a policy with clear “national” ancillary effects is carbon farming in Australia as investigated by
Kragt et al. (2016).
1

2
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is effected. Frequently, the local benefits are subsumed under “sustainable development benefits” and some link between climate policy objectives and the sustainable development goals
(SDGs) is derived. In other words, the transfer-induced export of climate protection improves
the prospects to attain SDGs in developing countries. Thus, we have a SDG argument, which
tilts the balance in favour of climate transfers in favour of the developing countries and thus
reinforces a potential rent-seeking motive. The positive distributional effect for developing
countries tends to be important as co-benefits, e.g. in the shape of air-quality benefits, are
assessed to be of significant size (see e.g. West et al. 2013). In their survey of studies considering air-quality-related ancillary benefits, Nemet et al. (2010) find that a range of studies assessed them even to be of a similar order of magnitude to greenhouse gas abatement cost
estimates. Bain et al. (2016) also confirm in their analysis of different types of ancillary effects
that these benefits could motivate action on climate change.
Yet, as different climate policies generate divergent levels of primary and ancillary benefits,
developing countries prefer those with a high degree of “ancillary” sustainable development
benefits and transfer-paying developed countries those with a high climate protection impact.
Hence, a conflict of interest arises. Moreover, efficiency in global climate protection could be
impaired, if – for distributional reasons – those activities are preferred that bring about high
co-benefit levels but at the same time lower climate protection levels.
It is in this area of tension, the international community has to make decisions about the role
climate transfers have to play in international climate cooperation. In the Paris Agreement,
Article 6 already addresses such international cooperative approaches like the successor of
the clean development mechanism (CDM), but details of their design are very controversially
discussed. The important task now is to implement provisions for climate transfers in a way
that respects both the efficiency and distributional concerns outlined above. In order to evaluate schemes in this regard, further (sub-)criteria like transaction costs and public acceptance
have to be taken into account, as they in turn affect allocative and distributive outcomes.
In §37 of Decision 1/CP.21 adopted by the Conference of the Parties in Paris 2015 it is set out
that future designs of cooperative mechanisms and climate transfer schemes should be based
on experience gained from existing mechanisms. In this paper, we will follow this line and
assess different transfer mechanisms focussing on the question how they have dealt with cobenefits and their advantages for developing countries in the past: 1) the Trust Fund of the
3
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Global Environment Facility (GEF) and 2) the CDM (including a premium market). The analysis
describes weaknesses and strengths of these systems and explores how the individual
schemes have handled trade-offs between different policy objectives and conflicts of interest
between donors and recipients. In particular, we explore how these mechanisms deal with
jointly generated ancillary effects of mitigation projects.
In our analysis of international transfer schemes, we employ a graphical method that has been
proposed by Pearce (2007) in order to investigate GEF transfers and basically rests on the
Coasean model.
In our study we use the terms ancillary benefits and co-benefits interchangeably, despite the
concern to call the ‘other benefits’ ancillary and the climate-change mitigation benefits primary. Some researchers argue that there should not be a ranking of benefits as they are
equally important. This lead to the predominant use of the term co-benefits in the more recent scientific literature. Yet, a climate policy instrument should serve climate change mitigation while ‘other benefits’ or local sustainable development are a plus and their generation is
not the key intention of this policy instrument. Nevertheless, they have to be taken into account in order to evaluate a project’s overall advantageousness, e.g. by offsetting the project’s
marginal cost and marginal local co-benefits (see e.g. Ekins 1996). In line with the famous Tinbergen Rule, which says that for an effective policy at least n independent policy instruments
are required to successfully reach n independent policy targets, the question therefore arises
whether primary and ancillary benefits can and should be meaningfully addressed by the same
instrument. To deal with this question will be a central objective of this paper.
The paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, we consider how the GEF Trust Fund has handled different benefit components in its system of disbursing funds towards the developing
world and we assess how the different features of the GEF have influenced (e.g. via transaction costs) efficiency and distribution. Then, in Section 3, we turn to the CDM scheme where
we in particular explore the effects that a ‘premium system’, which requires a minimum level
of local sustainability co-benefits. These effects are then contrasted with those identified for
the GEF schemes before. In Section 4, we compare the discussed schemes w.r.t. the various
evaluation criteria that are of importance for allocation and distribution. Emphasizing the
strengths and weaknesses of the schemes may improve the design of new schemes and support decision-making under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. Section 5 concludes.
4
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II.

The Global Environment Facility and Co-Benefits

The Global Environment Facility (GEF) was established as an international financial mechanism
to tackle global environmental problems in 1992. Initially it concentrated on the four focal
areas climate change, biodiversity, ozone depletion and international waters. The World Bank,
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) were chosen as the implementing agencies during the Facility’s early
years. As Kaul and Conceição (2006: 39) point out, “[t]he Global Environment Facility is a precursor of today’s emerging carbon markets” because it “facilitates trade between countries in
the inputs to” global public good provision.
In the context of climate change, Article 4 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) was of particular importance for the GEF. In this Article it is stated that the
developed country Parties and other Parties included in Annex II shall provide financial resources, “needed by the developing countries to meet the agreed full incremental costs” of –
amongst other things – climate change mitigation undertaken by developing countries. In line
with the provisions of Article 4, the GEF’s available funds are provided by developed countries
and the Facility channels these funds towards developing countries in order to support projects and measures reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In this regard, financing “incremental
cost” means covering the extra expense incurred by incremental activities of developing countries benefiting the global environment. Incremental activities are those actions of developing
countries that would not have occurred without the support of the GEF. Put it differently, in
order to identify incremental activity one distinguishes between two policy scenarios, i.e. between the “business-as-usual” (see GEF 2007) climate policy scenario without assistance by
the GEF in a developing country and the scenario where the Facility’s support modified the
climate protection efforts in this country. Thus, the activities above and beyond the “businessas-usual” (or baseline) are “incremental”.
Meanwhile, the GEF is not only entrusted with the operation of the Financial Mechanism of
the Convention, but it also administers the “Least Developed Countries Fund”, the “Special
Climate Change Fund” and provides secretariat services to the “Adaptation Fund” (see IISD
2019). Furthermore, it also serves as part of the financial mechanism of the Paris Agreement
as was agreed at the COP 21 in Paris in 2015. The Paris Agreement requested the GEF to support the establishment of the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency, for example, which
5
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seeks to strengthen the institutional and technical capacities of non-Annex I countries to meet
the transparency requirements defined in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement.
Although the implementation of the GEF Trust Fund (i.e. the Fund that was established on the
eve of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit) was initially driven with global-benefit-orientation, the GEF
accepted already in its pilot phase (June 1991 to mid-1994) “that the local/global benefits
distinction would be blurred in many cases” (Pearce 1995: 143). A key principle of the GEF is
to aim at cost-effectiveness. Thus, the money of the GEF Trust Fund is to be disbursed in a way
that for given funds secures a maximum of global benefits.
In the early years of the GEF Trust Fund there was an intense discussion not only about the
correct determination of the “business-as-usual” (or baseline), but also about the level of
transfers when supported projects are jointly producing global and local benefits. For such
cases, which tend to be the rule and not the exception, two polar financing concepts were
discussed, i.e. the financing of net incremental cost (NIC) and of gross incremental cost (GIC).
The NIC and GIC stand for the lower and upper bounds of the agreed full incremental cost that
are to be reimbursed (see, e.g. Heintz and Tol 1996: 2-3 and Pearce 1995: 168-170).
While the GIC concept does not offset the costs of incremental activities with the domestic
co-benefits or ancillary benefits of these GEF-supported activities in developing countries, the
NIC concept nets out domestic benefits in the shape of ancillary benefits as well of direct economic benefits, e.g. derived by the host country from saved energy expenses. Thus, the international NIC-based compensations are lower than those associated with the GIC concept and
the principle of cost-effectiveness pursued by the GEF suggests the application of the NIC concept. 3 In line with this, King (2006) argues that consideration of domestic as well as global
benefits “is important because international compensation for incremental cost should be provided net of the domestic benefits.”
In Figure 1 below, the transfers of both the NIC and the GIC concepts are illustrated for a
stylized situation where the transfers should bring the considered developing countries’ GHG
abatement to a globally efficient level, where marginal abatement costs equal global marginal
abatement benefits. In this figure ai* stands for the “business-as-usual” abatement level of

Cervigni (1998: 228) points out: “The standard argument in favour of net incremental cost is its cost-effectiveness: more conservation can be achieved for any dollar spent when international resources are used to pay only
the net cost of incremental conservation measures.”

3

6
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country i, which is assumed to represent the abatement level that a “rational” country would
choose voluntarily, i.e. where the marginal mitigation benefits MBi enjoyed by country i are
equal to the marginal net abatement cost MAC-MCB for this country. The net marginal abatement costs are assumed to comprise the gross marginal abatement costs MAC minus the domestic marginal co-benefits MCB that are regularly “private” from the developing country’s
point of view. The abatement level a* is the globally optimal abatement level in country i,
towards which the GEF transfer scheme intends to raise the abatement in country i.

MAC,
MB

GPMBi+RW
F

MAC
E

MBi

D‘

MAC-MCB

D
A‘
A
C‘
C

B
ai*

a*

GHG abatement

Figure 1: Illustration of GIC and NIC Schemes
The dotted triangle depicts the domestic net costs of attaining the “business-as-usual” level
(or baseline) from the perspective of the developing country.
The area ABCD (dashed area) stands for the net-incremental-cost transfer payments required
to attain the optimum a*, i.e. where the global public marginal benefits GPMBi+R of GHG
abatement are equal to the net marginal abatement costs for the developing country.
In contrast, the area A’BCD’ (comprising the dashed and checkered areas and the small monocromatic light grey triangle) represents the gross-incremental-cost transfer payment to be
made when the abatement is raised up to the level a*. The figure clearly shows that the NIC
concept is more cost-effective: Given limited funds for climate transfers, the use of the
7
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method reimbursing only the NIC would bring about a higher climate change mitigation level
as the funds saved relatively to the gross concept could be spent elsewhere in order to induce
additional abatement activity. Under the NIC scheme, the global community would enjoy a
net welfare gain of the triangle ADF.
Yet, even if the GEF would pay the GIC, the global community would enjoy a net welfare gain,
which is reflected by the area of triangle A’EF minus DD’E (the dark grey triangle minus the
small light grey triangle). DD’E comprises GEF payments for abatement that exceed the global
community’s benefits (from this abatement) as reflected by GPMBi+RW, where index RW stands
for the ‘rest of the world’.
The host country of the mitigation project will receive a payment ABCD from the NIC scheme
and a higher payment ABCD + A’ADD’ from the GIC scheme. The additional net benefits the
host country will receive due to the implementation of a NIC transfer scheme corresponds to
the area ABCC’. These are country i’s additional primary benefits enjoyed from the increase of
the GHG abatement level from ai* to a*. The respective net benefits in a GIC scheme are
ABCC’+ A’ADD’, where A’ADD’ stands for the rise in ancillary benefits.
However, the NIC concept raised objections because of its one-sided distributional implications. It has been argued that surpluses of incremental actions should be shared between donor and recipient countries of GEF funds, and “not appropriated fully by the global community
through the net incremental cost principle” (see King 1993: 27). Yet, as explained above also
the NIC concept benefits the host country as it raises this country’s benefits by an amount
reflected by area ABCC’.
Pearce (1995: 169) stresses that project sustainability and maximum cooperation favour the
gross-cost concept. Interests of local communities should be carefully taken into account to
raise their willingness to cooperate and net gains to local communities must be sustainable as
otherwise project gains could be short-lived (see GEF EO 2006: 136). Therefore, not only because of distributional trade-offs it might be considered to be opportune to seek for a compromise, i.e. to apply a sharing rule which is an intermediate between the NIC and the GIC
rule. Indeed, as Pearce (2000) states, “[i]n practice, GEF tends to operate so that only some
domestic ancillary benefits are deducted from the ‘gross’ incremental cost. Local environmental benefits may be computed but not deducted.”
8
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Incremental cost calculations at the GEF came to an end in 2006. As assessments are made
mostly at the end of the design of GEF projects and therefore have little impact on their design,
it was argued that incrementality could only play an insignificant role as its exact size cannot
be determined objectively ex ante. Actually, incrementality is achieved “through the initial
negotiation that takes place between the GEF agents and the recipients in the definition of the
baseline and the global environmental benefits that will be produced in the project” (van den
Berg 2007: vii). Another important reason for challenging GEF incremental cost calculations
was the view (expressed by key people involved in GEF project design and review) that a clear
distinction between local and global environmental benefits is largely artificial or even impossible to be reached (GEF EO 2007: 7). Furthermore, there was much confusion of stakeholders
about incremental cost concepts and procedures.
Due to the problems associated with the quantitative assessment of incremental cost, the GEF
started to put greater emphasis on qualitative aspects of “incremental reasoning” (GEF IEO
2018), which even though only vaguely specified has meanwhile become the core principle
underlying the GEF. This principle “encapsulates the basic rationale for a project seeking GEF
funding”, which is the global environmental objectives and the GEF’s contribution to the additional cost of projects required to pursue these objectives (GEF EO 2007: 43). The focus on
incremental reasoning tends to significantly reduce transaction costs as incremental cost calculations are skipped. However, Broughton (2009: 69) points out that the abandoning of a
“hard” norm in the shape of incremental-cost calculations and the transition to the “softer”
way of assessing incrementality, “may not make the concept easier to understand or to apply
within projects for those applicants searching for clarification”. 4 Furthermore, the softer norm
may find less acceptance in countries paying international transfers as there may be more
room for manoeuvre by developing countries during the negotiations (that take place between the GEF agents and the recipients of funds) aiming at appropriating additional rents at
the expense of the donors. Yet, much depends on the bargaining power of involved agents as
can be observed from the CDM example addressed in the next section.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that incremental reasoning does not only play a role for the GEF
Trust Fund, but e.g. the Green Climate Fund also refers to it in its requirements for funding
This holds the more as incremental reasoning was not defined by the GEF when it was introduced as the core
principle. According to GEF EO (2007), “[p]rocedurally, it implies logical argumentation and case-based reasoning, which has implications when ascertaining the basic rationale for GEF projects.”

4

9
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proposals (GCF 2019: 9). Yet, it is also argued by the GCF (2018: 5) that quantitative approaches allow a more precise and accurate assessment of incremental costs.

III.

The Clean Development Mechanism, Premiums and Co-Benefits

Another international mechanism in the context of climate finance is the “Clean Development
Mechanism” (CDM). This mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol was designed with the dual
aim of assisting developing countries in achieving sustainable development (SD) and of helping
developed countries in achieving compliance with their Kyoto commitments. The CDM allows
governments or private entities of developed countries (having ratified the Protocol) to implement emission reduction projects in developing countries and to receive credit in the shape
of “certified emission reductions” (CERs). These CERs can be counted against the developed
countries’ national reduction targets. Hence, both involved countries should benefit from the
mechanism: while the transfer payer will receive CERs, the transfer receiving developing country will obtain national sustainable development benefits.
SD benefits are regularly – and yet quite broadly – classified into the three categories ‘environmental’, ‘social’ and ‘economic’. Likewise, in the context of the CDM under the Kyoto Protocol, there is a lack of a clear definition of SD and an absence of the requirement to monitor
SD impacts.5 In the Marrakesh Accords it was affirmed in 2001 (UNFCCC 2002) that “it is the
host Party’s prerogative to confirm whether a clean development mechanism project activity
assists it in achieving sustainable development”. Due to the ambiguity of SD concepts and indicators, developing countries may get a strategic incentive to set rather low sustainable development standards before bargaining starts in order to become a particularly attractive
CDM investment location for foreign investors that are primarily interested in earning CERs.
This provides other examples for strategically motivated pre-bargaining moves that have been
considered in other contexts of international environmental economics (see Buchholz and
Konrad 1994 and Beccherle and Tirole 2011).

Local job creation may serve as one indicator for the development impact of CDM projects. Mori-Clement and
Bednar-Friedl (2019) investigate such employment effects for projects in Brazil, for example.
5
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In the competition for CDM projects and financing, a ‘race to the bottom’-risk is pending (see,
e.g. Sutter 2003, Olsen 2007 and Torvanger et al. 2013), which means that developing countries are willing to accept more and more projects with rather low co-benefits as they compete
with other countries for international project funds.
Interestingly, in times of a falling demand for CERs after 2011–2012,6 i.e. when bargaining
power on the supply side was decreasing, the ‘race to the bottom’-risk tended to be reduced
to some extent, as the relatively (to the demand) high supply “enabled buyers to differentiate
between CERs of different characteristics” (Michaelowa, Espelange and Hoch 2020: 54). Yet,
this explanation seems to not fully capture the attenuation of the “race to the bottom”-risk as
the high supply could have just exerted a pressure on the price of CERs instead.7 Possibly the
developments on the CERs market were accompanied by investors’ rising attention for public
concern about sustainable development, and purchasing on the premium market was part of
a marketing strategy partly in the sense of “green-washing”. It seems that there is still much
scope for research in this context.
Sutter and Parreno (2007: 89) are among the first to propose a premium price for CERs from
those projects that strongly contribute to sustainable development. They argue that this might
raise the share of such projects in the global carbon market. As Sutter (2003: 202) points out,
the prerequisite for charging premium prices is a market for premium CERs and explains that
such premium CERs could be attractive for purchasers as they might help to prevent reputation losses that may arise from financing unsustainable CDM projects. In order to establish
such markets, labels for certain CERs had to be created that indicate a higher level of sustainability co-effects associated with these CERs. Among those labels are the “Gold Standard” that
has issued more than 98.4 million carbon credits in 2018 (Willers and Cima 2019). On the Gold
Standard and other standards like the Climate, Community & Biodiversity Standard and the
Social Carbon Standard see, e.g. Michaelowa et al. (2019) and Michaelowa, Espelage and Hoch
(2020).
However, GHG emission reductions by projects with a higher sustainable development component clearly tend to be more expensive than reductions by those with low local co-benefits

On the development of international carbon markets in the recent two decades see Michaelowa, Shishlov and
Brescia (2019).
7
Indeed, the price for CERs declined sharply in the period 2011-2012, see e.g. World Bank (2019: 59).
6
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also due to now necessary project evaluation and labelling. Especially if small projects are
concerned, the transaction costs for receiving a label may become prohibitively high. As Robinson et al. (2016: 134) stress, mechanisms like the Gold Standard need to carefully balance
transparency, accountability and transaction costs. Transaction costs usurp at least a portion
of the welfare gains that the private offsetting standards intend to bring about. Due to their
higher cost (relatively to those of projects established for the regular markets), GHG abatement activities for a premium market tend not to be cost-effective from a climate-changemitigation point of view.
Furthermore, Olsen et al. (2019: 247) stress, “sustainability labels have never developed beyond a small niche in the compliance market and attract only a small share of the carbon finance available”. Hence, the voluntary nature of the premium scheme seems to be no appropriate blueprint for future schemes under the Paris Agreement. Instead, some liability would
be required in order to raise the market penetration of projects with higher co-benefits.
If a future scheme stipulates minimum sustainability standards for CDM projects that are beyond those presently employed so that projects with low co-benefit levels could definitely be
banned, then the marginal abatement cost curve obviously tends to rise. The effects of a shift
towards more sustainable projects on the outcome of a CDM transfer scheme is illustrated in
Figure 2, which resembles Figure 1 to some extent. Yet, in Figure 2, the measures to accomplish the GHG abatement are different to that in Figure 1 as they involve higher local co-benefits. In order to keep the elaborations concerning the CDM comparable to those concerning
the GEF scheme, we suppose in our stylized depiction that the considered host country is only
compensated for the project costs and the other agents (investors, CERs buyer) are from the
rest of the world. The increase of marginal abatement costs of projects yielding higher local
sustainability benefits is reflected by a constant marginal cost mark-up MCM. The MAC curve
reflects the marginal abatement costs for the mitigation activities conducted if no minimum
standards were established and we assume that this is the same MAC curve that applies in the
GEF scheme (Figure 1). MAC + MCM represents the marginal abatement costs in a system
where a (higher) minimum sustainable-development standard is required. Due to the cost
mark-up, the purchasers are required to pay a higher CER price while presently buyers do this
voluntarily on premium markets.

12
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Postulating that it still pays for investors to generate abatement up to level a*, the global
community would enjoy a welfare gain that is reflected by the area of the dark grey triangle
minus the light grey triangle. This global community’s welfare gain is smaller than the one that
would occur under the GIC and NIC schemes as mitigation costs rose.
The international transfers are represented by the area A’’BCD’’ (area below the line depicting
MAC + MCM in the range between ai* and a*), for which holds that A’’BCD’’ > A’BCD’ > ABCD.
Therefore, CDM transfers via the premium market that are required to attain a* are higher
than those associated with the GEF schemes. Consequently, Figure 2 illustrates the fact that
the premium CDM is less cost-effective from a climate-protection point of view.

MAC,
MB
GPMBi+RW
MAC+MCM
D‘‘

MBi

MAC

A‘‘

B

C

ai*

a*

GHG abatement

Figure 2: Illustration of the CDM When a Minimum Level of Local Co-Effects is Required
If marginal costs of projects further rise (beyond the MCM depicted in Figure 2) due to higher
SD requirements, the marginal abatement cost curve MAC + MCM would shift further upwards. Cost-effectiveness regarding GHG mitigation of transfers further declines. As also the
co-benefit levels become higher, the change to ‘more sustainable’ projects may cause a downward shift of the net marginal abatement cost curve which reflects (MAC + MCM) - MCB.
Figure 3 captures the situation where MCM equals the increase in MCB, so that a* is on the
same level as a* in Figure 1. Yet, it also indicates via arrows the effects of the introduction of
13
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the premium standard for the case where both marginal abatement cost and MCB increase,
but the increase of MCB becomes stronger than the rise in marginal abatement cost as reflected by MCM.

MAC,
MB
GPMBi+RW
MAC+MCM
D‘‘

MAC
Net MAC = MAC+MCM-MCB

MBi

A‘‘

B

C

ai*

a*

GHG abatement

Figure 3: Taking into Account of the Premium-like Scheme’s Effects on Co-benefits and Marginal Abatement Costs
While marginal net domestic abatement costs MAC + MCM – MCB decrease for the developing
country, the level of received transfer payments for each unit of abatement increases as the
MAC + MCM curve moves upwards. The efficient abatement level would increase beyond a*.
While the dark grey triangle shrinks, the light grey triangle tends to increase, reducing the
global community’s welfare gain despite a higher efficient GHG abatement level a*.
Consequently, the level of transfer payments per unit of GHG abatement increases while net
MAC decrease. The abatement level pursued by the developing country, which is characterized by an equality of net MAC and GPMBi+RW, would rise beyond a*. The dark grey triangle
shrinks, the light grey triangle increases, which implies a reduction of the global community’s
welfare gain despite the higher abatement level (now beyond a*). The developing country will
gain due to higher local SD effects and higher mitigation enjoyed.
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In the case where the increase in MCB is weaker than the rise in marginal abatement cost, i.e.
the premium MCM is rather high, both marginal cost curve MAC + MCM as well as net marginal cost curve MAC + MCM – MCB will shift upwards. The net MAC curve would even be
located above MAC, i.e. the curve reflecting the marginal abatement costs for the mitigation
activities conducted if no premium market would have been established. Consequently, if an
international agreement would stipulate a minimum SD requirement, this may even reduce
the willingness of developing countries to supply mitigation, as a* tends to decrease. Global
climate protection and welfare would decrease.
Despite the poor cost-effectiveness in abating GHGs and the niche character of sustainability
labels inducing price premiums under the CDM, premium prices are now indeed getting new
prominence in the context of the Paris Agreement. New proposals for improving (local) sustainability effects of internationally supported climate change mitigation projects are the subject of the discussion in the following section.

IV.

Cooperative Approaches in Accordance with Article 6 of the Paris Agreement

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement establishes international cooperative approaches for climate
protection and the support of sustainable development is one of its major characteristics. As
Articles 6.2-6.3 set out, Parties can cooperate directly with one another on a voluntary basis.
This renders possible the implementation of emission reduction measures in one country and
the transfer of associated emission reduction “credits” to another country so that the reductions can be counted towards the latter country’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC).
Furthermore, it allows to link emissions-trading schemes of two or more countries. Articles
6.4-6.7 establish mechanisms to contribute to mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and to
support sustainable development. The activity cycle of those mechanisms may share similarities with the activity cycle of the CDM (see Michaelowa, Espelage and Müller 2019). In Articles
6.8-6.9 the importance of non-market approaches is recognized, but it still has to be specified
how these approaches are to be executed and as is stated on a UNFCCC (2020) website, the
non-market approaches mechanism can presently “be anything and everything, provided it’s
not market-based”.
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The consideration of co-effects as displayed in the subsequent sections will help inform decision makers about the individual concepts’ merits and weaknesses in the context of considering local sustainability effects. As outlined in the introduction, efficiency in protecting the climate and the attainment of distributional objectives may be two conflicting goals. The efficiency argument is represented by the sub-criteria cost-effectiveness of mitigation activities
and (low) transaction cost of the transfer scheme.
The distributional argument refers to the conflicts between “rewards to developing countries”
(RDC) and “public acceptance in industrialized countries” (PAIC). High RDC would imply that
ethical concerns are well addressed as the poorer countries are not exploited via the transfer
scheme. Yet, this may imply higher transfer levels for combating global warming and therefore
conflicts with cost-effectiveness (and hence the efficiency goal) and with PAIC as the distributional advantages in developing countries would be at the expense of the donors.
However, the cake for all could be expanded by caring for efficiency (i.e. high cost-effectiveness of mitigation projects and low transaction costs of the transfer scheme) and thus for
benefits for the global community. This tends to mitigate also the distributional conflicts (albeit a potential loss of co-benefits in developing countries, but a gain in global climate protection).
To keep the evaluation of schemes simple, we distinguish between three ratings only, where
the medium rank is ᴏ and the schemes deviating upwards all get a + and those deviating downwards a -. Some of the tentative evaluation depends on the distribution of bargaining power
between donors and recipients and specific regulatory provisions and thus more than one
evaluation could apply, e.g. ᴏ/-.
As can be observed from Table 1, the picture is rather mixed. Depending on the weighting of
distributional and efficiency arguments, different schemes may serve as models for future
schemes within the Paris framework.

16
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Table 1: Tentative Evaluation of Mechanisms for Different Criteria
Cost-effectiveness

Rewards to devel-

Public acceptance in

(mitigation)

oping (host) coun-

developed countries

tries

(hard norm)

Transaction costs

GEF-NIC

+

-

+

-

GEF-GIC

ᴏ

ᴏ

ᴏ

+

GEF-IR

+/ᴏ

+/ᴏ

ᴏ /-

+/ᴏ

CDM

+/ᴏ

ᴏ/-

+

ᴏ

CDM-P (qualitative

-

+

-

ᴏ /-

-

+

-

-

norms)
CDM-P

(quantita-

tive norms)

For instance, Olsen, Arens and Mersmann (2018: 393) warn in their discussion of lessons learnt
from the CDM that concerning the voluntary mechanisms “there is a great risk of repeating
the ‘race to the bottom’ known from the CDM, where the prerogative for host countries to
approve SD has resulted in weak national SD criteria.” This warning reflects a major concern
about adverse distributional effects. A higher weight on distributional aspects tends – as Table
1 indicates – to have a negative influence on efficiency of climate change mitigation. Yet, one
has to note that at the same time other studies suggest that positive allocative effects may be
triggered, too – e.g. via the enhancement of perceived fairness, 8 which spurs the willingness
of developing countries to participate actively in climate policy (see e.g. Rübbelke 2011 and
Pittel and Rübbelke 2013).
Like in the case of the CDM, several scientists highlight the distributional role private offsetting
standards (like the “Gold Standard”) may play in future international climate policy and some
explicitly suggest applying premium prices in order to overcome the problem of the race to

There are several studies addressing international climate finance and its influence on (perceived) fairness or
justice, e.g. Pickering, Jotzo and Wood (2015), Pickering, Betzold and Skovgard (2017) and Colenbrander, Dodman and Mitlin (2018).
8
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the bottom. The positive view concerning the prospects of private offsetting standards is encouraged by empirical findings that many buyers of CERs are willing to pay a price premium;
however, according to Parnphumeesup and Kerr (2015), charity groups and governments tend
to be more willing to pay a premium than private sector buyers. Purchasers at premium prices
do this by either because of altruistic motives or – as outlined in an earlier section of this paper
– because of higher quality of their investments, i.e. a higher level of project sustainability.
Hultman, Lou and Hutton (2019) point out that it may become important to encourage more
purchasers to act on the premium market in the future. Blum and Lövbrand (2019) discuss the
role of carbon markets and private offsetting standards in the Paris climate regime and express
the view that private standard setters fill “perceived legitimacy gaps” of public governance
mechanisms. Olsen et al. (2019) endorse a qualitative approach to assess, label and rank the
expected SD benefits of projects. By labelling based on qualitative data, transaction costs
could be reduced relatively to a quantitative approach. Olsen et al. (2019) suggest to link the
Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the future
by using the SDG global indicator framework in evaluating sustainable development aspects
of mitigation activities. There is already a Gold Standard called “Gold Standard for the Global
Goals” that quantifies and verifies impacts of climate initiatives toward multiple SDGs.9
This link between SDGs and climate protection could provide new opportunities for industrialized countries. The updated National Sustainable Development Strategy of Germany (The
Federal Government 2018: 8) sets out the importance of the 2030 Agenda for SDGs for alleviating international movements of refugees and migrants, for example. European countries
may strongly benefit from sustainable development in Northern Africa, for example, but to a
lesser extent from such a development in Central America. Thus, some components of sustainable development are not exclusively private for the hosts of climate change mitigation
projects, but spillovers spread transcontinentally or even globally. 10 These effects resemble
the effects of impure public goods (see e.g. Ihori 1992).
However, consistently thought out, the consideration of SDGs in the pricing of GHG emission
reduction credits or certificates would have to be also applied in the context of the EU ETS,

See https://www.goldstandard.org/articles/gold-standard-global-goals.
A distinction between direct and final or ultimate impact (van den Berg 2011: 413) seems to be relevant in
this context.
9
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raising the transaction costs and reducing the attractiveness of the economic instrument of
emission permit trading.

V.

Conclusions

The discussion of the treatment of co-benefits in climate finance has undergone considerable
changes in the past decades: Applying tools (like minimum SD standards or premium systems)
to raise local sustainable development effects of climate protection projects in developing
countries would not have been seriously taken into consideration in the early years of the GEF.
In the early and mid 1990s, the discussion instead was mainly about global benefits and attaining efficiency in greenhouse gas abatement and, hence there was – for cost-effectiveness
reasons – some preference for reducing the transfers at least by a part of the domestic cobenefits in the host country of the climate protection project. A double-rewarding of the host
countries would have been clearly declined as this is even less cost-effective from a pure climate-protection perspective than the gross-incremental-cost method.
Application of a premium-price mechanism as meanwhile frequently proposed will, however,
reward the host countries twice: domestic sustainability co-benefits are enjoyed and additionally a premium is received (for these enjoyed co-benefits). Purchasers have to some extent
been willing in the past to buy at such higher prices for several reasons (e.g. for improving
their reputation as firms or countries), and there are no concerns as long as this is accomplished on a voluntary basis.
In contrast, establishing an obligatory labelling system and with it making premium prices a
prerequisite for activities under Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement will raise the costs of such
desired activities. Such higher-cost burdens for cooperative approaches are not new: historically a 2%-share of proceeds from the sale of CERs is already channelled towards the Adaptation Fund. Higher cost and thus higher prices of certificates, on the one hand, reduce the functionality of mechanisms under Article 6 of the Paris Agreements as potential purchasers of
certificates, who are interested in reducing climate-policy related costs only (and not in sustainable development elsewhere) will lower their demand on the certificate market.
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One may in general distinguish two polar views: On the one hand, opposition against premium
prices will be raised by a first group taking the stand that climate policy should primarily combat global warming threatening life on our whole planet. On the other hand, the double-rewarding of hosts of projects tends to reduce the opposition of a second group considering
cooperative approaches under Article 6 as a kind of indulgence trade and exhibit some morally
motivated “joy of giving” towards the developing countries. Although respecting the needs of
developing countries, there is a big risk that the objectives of international climate policy are
not clear enough anymore and the transfer mechanisms of climate policy become ineffective
in combatting the main threat which thus – to some degree - may come out of sight.
The first group, for which efficiency of climate protection is the main concern, may also insist
on hard norms in order to make sure that not too much funding is diverted from effective
climate protection. The second group, for which distributional motives are of high importance,
has a preference for softer norms instead. The members of this group also point out that applying hard norms (e.g. via quantification of co-benefits) involves high transaction cost and
thus impairs efficiency, too, since some to the premium may be consumed and consultancies
may benefit instead. Softer norms may also have the advantage to save time and thus to accelerate the pace at which abatement projects can be launched in developing countries. Moreover, softer norms for accepting projects seem to be attractive also for purely pragmatic reasons, as some co-benefits are hard or virtually impossible to quantify in a reasonable way, like
e.g. those benefits associated with gender aspects. Yet, just this creates much scope for rentseeking activities that should be avoided from the perspective of the first group.One way to
address the deep conflict between the two groups is to avoid the overburdening of policies
with the expectation to become overarching cures for multiple problems. In this vein Peterson
and Skovgaard (2019: 72) argue that “climate finance and development aid are defined by
different objectives and should be treated therefore as distinct entities”, which means following the Tinbergen Rule stated in the Introduction. Hence, the promotion of local sustainable
development of developing countries should be reserved to development aid.
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